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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Charles Gregory Tackett appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony 
Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter, DUI). He asserts that the magistrate court 
erred by refusing to accept his guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 14, 2011, the State issued a citation to Mr. Tackett for an enhanced DUI. 
(R., p.5.) He was arraigned the next day. (See generally, 5/15/2011 Tr.) He informed 
the magistrate that he wished to plead guilty. (5/15/2011 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-17.) The court 
responded that he could do that, but that he could not be sentenced that day because 
the court would want an alcohol evaluation prior to sentencing. (5/15/2011 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.5-15.) The State responded that Mr. Tackett appeared to have prior DUI convictions 
but it had no time to order the prior judgments and that it anticipated that Mr. Tackett's 
case may eventually be transferred to the county for a felony DUI charge. (5/15/2011 
Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.7, L.4) 
Counsel for Mr. Tackett indicated that he was not aware of the alleged priors, but 
asserted that Mr. Tackett had a right to plead guilty that day and wished to do so. 
(5/15/2011 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17.) The court then inquired of both parties whether it was 
required to accept the guilty plea because it did not know the answer. (5/15/2011 
Tr., p.7, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Tackett asserted that he had a right to plead guilty that day; the 
State responded that it would be unfair to permit him to plead guilty before it had time to 
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allege the prior DUI convictions to make Mr. Tackett's case a felony. (5/15/2011 
Tr., p.8, Ls.2-25.) 
The court took a recess to consider the issue. (5/15/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-9.) 
Afterward, the court stated, 
Well, I will tell you that my hiatus from the courtroom there was to seek 
some input from my colleagues and I got mixed opinions. I got two that 
said you don't have to take it and one said you do - or two said you do 
and one said you don't. So that didn't help me a lot and everybody was 
pretty definitive on the - on their approach to it. 
I'm going to do this. I'm going to not accept the plea, but I'm going to do 
this. I'm going to ask that the case be assigned to my calendar. I'm going 
to give you folks an opportunity to give some research to me on this. And 
so if you are able to come up with something that shows I'm not applying 
the law, I will specifically indicate that the state has the right to - or that 
the defendant - you know, if I'm just flat wrong on this, [defense counsel], 
then I'll give your guy an extended opportunity to enter the plea that he 
tried to enter today. So that's the fairest way I can think of to approach 
this. 
(5/15/2011 Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.13, L.12) At the subsequent hearing, the court concluded 
that it possessed the discretion to refuse a guilty plea and it refused Mr. Tackett's plea. 
(9/8/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.8-25.) 
The State then charged Mr. Tackett with felony DUI. (R., p.37.) Mr. Tackett 
pleaded guilty to felony DUI but preserved the right to appeal from the magistrate 
court's refusal to accept his guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI. (R., p.42.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with one year determinate. (R., p.53.) 
Mr. Tackett appealed. (R., p.57.) He asserts that the district court erred by refusing his 
guilty because he had a right to plead guilty when he made his attempt. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it refused to accept Mr. Tackett's guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Accept Mr. Tackett's Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Tackett asserts that the district court erred by refusing his guilty plea because 
Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6(b) gives him a right to enter a plea in magistrate 
court. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Refused To Accept Mr. Tackett's Guilty Plea 
The magistrate orally pronounced its reasons for rejecting the guilty plea. It 
reasoned as follows: 
Well, here's my thoughts on it and I'll start with this. I think that in reading 
Schoger [v. State] [148 Idaho 622 (201 O)]; I mean, it's I'll agree off the bat 
that it's a little bit of a square peg in a round hole because that was a post-
conviction relief case. And so the issue was sort of looking at it in reverse. 
They weren't really looking at what the judge did as much as was it 
incompetence of counsel to not raise whether the judge can do it. So it's 
one step back from that. But I think they generally get the essence to it. 
And what they basically say is that what Alford says is that that generally 
in broad terms the case doesn't require judges to accept pleas, but that if 
the legislature or the court wants to make a rule saying that you have to, 
they can. And then that there are some states where they have 
specifically done that. 
And then the last paragraph that's pertinent to - the last paragraph of 
Schoger, I think is they're saying we're making it clear that we haven't 
done that in Idaho. They're saying that no provision of Idaho law requires 
acceptance of a guilty plea. I think then they come back to the discretion 
of the Court. 
And I was trying to think of all the different permutations of how this comes 
up and there are a lot of times where I'll decline to take guilty pleas at 
arraignments. Typically it's when I think the defendant isn't - I realize it's 
a different track, but sometimes it will be when I don't think the defendant's 
competence is completely clear to me either because they're under the 
influence or mentally have some issues. There will be times when it would 
be a very serious misdemeanor and I've got a clear sense that the 
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defendant's just trying to plead guilty in order to hurry up and get through 
the process and they haven't really got the benefit of counsel. 
And I think that in all of those cases you know, I have on a number of 
occasions just simply told somebody that when they flip-flop back and 
forth about whatever - you know, I did what I did, yes, I did, no, I didn't. I 
mean, not too much unlike the argument that was in front of Judge Horton 
in Schoger. It was I'm not sure, so I'm going to decline to do this, you 
know, in the interest of being cautious. And I think the bottom line of it is 
in the interest of justice. And I think I have - it has to be one of the things 
that the Court has in its discretion, is the ability to say what is the interest 
of justice here. 
I agree with [the prosecutor], especially in the case of a misdemeanor that 
has to be brought before the Court within 24 hours, it's not always 
possible to get all of that done that quickly. There's certainly liberty 
interests of the defendant, but those can be addressed in other ways. And 
I speedy trial is certainly not going to be satisfied within 48 hours or 
whenever the first arraignment is. There's ways of adjusting somebody's 
bond that can allow then to have their liberty addressed in ways other than 
pleading guilty. 
But in this case I think that - that the interest of justice allows me to 
decline to take the plea and I think that the language of Schoger is pretty -
pretty specific. I mean, it says we remove all doubt that no provision of 
Idaho law requires the Court to accept a guilty plea and I think that's - you 
know, which you're right that we were cautious not to read things too 
broadly, that's about as clear cut as I can find it. 
So having considered those things, and I think that I do acknowledge that 
it is an exercise of my discretion to do that, I think it's within the bounds of 
my discretion. And my reasons are that I believe the interest of justice are 
served in not using [the prosecutor's] phrase, engaging in a race to the 
courthouse where the state has to do its due diligence of not being able to 
get where they want to get. 
(Tr., p.30, L.14- p.34. L.16.) The court thus based its decision on its reading of the 
recent opinion of Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622 (2010). Mr. Tackett asserts that the 
district court erred because Schoger can be distinguished. If this Court concludes that it 
cannot be, then Schoger is manifestly wrong and must be overruled. 
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In Schoger, the defendant was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and 
reached a plea agreement in which she would plead guilty and the State would agree to 
a sentencing recommendation. Id. at 623-24. At the entry of plea hearing, she denied 
that she ever intended to exercise control over the drugs in her house; based upon this, 
the court refused to accept either a guilty plea or an Alford plea. Id. at 624. She then 
proceeded to trial, where she was found guilty. Id. 
She subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that her trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the factual and legal basis necessary for 
her to plead guilty, and that her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert 
that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting her Alford plea. Id. With regard 
to her appellate counsel, Ms. Schoger argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting her plea and by failing to 
assert that the district court lacked the discretion to reject the plea. Id. at 626. 
Regarding the claim that the court lacked jurisdiction to reject the plea, the Court 
noted that Ms. Schoger asserted that Idaho Criminal Rule 11 required the court to 
accept an Alford plea. Id. at 629. Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (a)states in relevant part: 
(1) In General. A defendant may plead guilty or not guilty. If a defendant 
refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear the court 
shall direct the entry of a plea of not guilty. 
(2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of 
the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 
review any specified adverse ruling ... 
Idaho Crim. R. 11 (a). Ms. Schoger asserted that because Rule 11 (a)(2) required the 
approval of the court and Rule 11 (a)(1) did not, "the rule necessarily requires the 
defendant to have a statutory right to plead guilty." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 629. 
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Ms. Schoger also asserted that the word "may" in a statute or rule should be construed 
as mandatory when the public interest or individual rights so require. Id. Finally, 
Ms. Schoger asserted that the language of Rule 11 (a)(1) was identical or analogous to 
the language in other state statutes that courts have found to confer a statutory right to 
plead guilty. Id. 
The Court did not address these arguments specifically, but discussed the 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and noted that Idaho law, "either 
indicate[d] that the court has discretion, or alternatively, that the law is not fully 
articulated or established in Idaho." Id. at 630. The Court then concluded, "[w]e hereby 
remove all doubt by holding that no provision of Idaho law, including I.C.R. 11, requires 
a court to accept a guilty plea. Acceptance of such a plea is specifically within the 
discretion of the trial court." Id. 
Mr. Tackett asserts that, despite its broad language, Schoger is distinguishable. 
As the Schoger Court noted, Ms. Schoger based her claim on Idaho Criminal Rule 
11 (a)(1 ). Thus, the specific issue before the Court was whether Rule 11 (a)(1) granted a 
right to enter a plea. The Court clearly held that it did not. But the Court was not called 
upon to interpret any other provision of Idaho law at the time, and its broad statement 
that "no provision of Idaho law" required the court to accept a plea must be considered 
dicta. 
Mr. Tackett's case is much different than Ms. Schoger's. Mr. Tackett was 
charged with a misdemeanor at the time he attempted to plead guilty, the misdemeanor 
criminal rules applied. And Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6, which governs the 
entry of pleas in magistrate court, is very different than Idaho Criminal Rule 11. 
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Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6(b) provides, "the defendant shall have the right to enter 
a plea to a misdemeanor citation or complaint before the court." M.C.R. 6(b). Thus, 
while Idaho Criminal Rule 11 uses the permissive term "may," Misdemeanor Rule 6 
clearly creates a right to enter a guilty plea. In such a circumstance, the magistrate 
court lacks the discretion to reject a guilty plea, and the magistrate court in this case 
erred by rejecting the plea. 
However, if this Court construes Schoger to foreclose the argument that any 
provision of Idaho law grants a defendant a right to plead guilty, Schoger is manifestly 
wrong. Stare decisis dictates that this Court follow controlling precedent, "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849 (2012) (citing Houghland Farms, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990)). The Schoger Court's statement that "no 
provision of Idaho law" required the trial court to accept a guilty plea is manifestly wrong 
in light of the specific directive of Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6(b) - that a defendant 
has a right to enter a guilty plea. Therefore, to the extent that Schoger forecloses the 
argument that Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 6(b) creates a right to plead guilty, Schoger 
is manifestly wrong and must overruled. 
Thus, while Idaho Criminal Rule 11 uses the permissive term "may," and does 
not create a right to enter a plea, Misdemeanor Rule 6 clearly creates a right to enter 
such a plea. In such a circumstance, the magistrate court lacks the discretion to reject 
a guilty plea, and the magistrate court erred by rejecting the plea in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tackett respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand this case to district court with instructions to enter a guilty plea to 
misdemeanor DUI. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2012. 
JUSTI M. RTIS 
Deputy ~ppellate Public Defender 
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